This paper presents an adaptive collusion attack on a buyer authentication watermarking scheme. To accomplish this attack, the traitors (i.e., dishonest buyers) select the pixels of their watermarked images generated from the same original image and average the selected pixels so as to remove the watermark information. Additionally, the forged image is of higher quality than any watermarked image. Both theoretical and experimental results demonstrate that our attack is very effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE rapid development of computer networks and the increased use of multimedia data via the Internet have resulted in faster and more convenient exchange of digital information. With the ease of editing and perfect reproduction, protection of ownership and prevention of unauthorized manipulation of digital audio, image and video materials become important concerns. Digital watermarking is a technique used to identify ownership and fight piracy in digital distribution networks. Its principle is to embed special labels in digital contents so as to degrade the quality of piracy, or confirm at least one traitor with high probability given that the probability of implicating an innocent is reasonably low. In recent years, researchers have made considerable progress in watermarking schemes [1] - [6] which are more and more robust to defeat many traditional attacks, such as nonlinear geometric attacks and common image transformations.
This manuscript is submitted to IEEE Transactions on Multimedia.
The author is with Institute for Infocomm Research, 21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore, 119613, Tel: +65-6874 2585, Fax:+65-6775 5014. email:wydong@i2r.a-star.edu.sg. 2 However, most of the invisible watermarking schemes are prone to average collusion attack [7] . Technically, a group of traitors average their individually watermarked copies and escape from being identified. Ergun et al. proved that the upper bound on the size of the traitor group is O( n ln(n)) when no traitor is captured, where n is the size of the cover signal. This result is of more importance in theory than in practice because the number of traitors is too big unless the target image is of high value. For a low-value image, it is probably not worth collecting that many watermarked images.
Although it may be not valuable to start the general collusion attack [7] on watermarking schemes, a dedicated collusion attack which exploits the vulnerability of a specific watermarking may be of interest. For instance, the schemes [8] [9] are vulnerable to the collusion attacks presented in [10] [11].
Mukherjee et al [1] proposed a spatial domain watermarking which is used to identify the buyer of an image.
Unfortunately, their scheme is vulnerable to the present collusion attack. Our attack is adaptive in nature. Technically, when the traitors find two different pixels produced from the same original pixel, they average these two pixels to obtain a new pixel. Those new pixels and the unchanged pixels in the original watermarked image constitute a pirated image. The pirated image not only has no watermark for identifying the traitors, but also is of higher quality than any original watermarked image. Because the quality of the pirated image is improved gradually when the number of traitors increases, buyers may be interested in joining the traitor group in order to get a high quality copy. The experiment result demonstrates the effectiveness of the present attack. This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the buyer authentication watermarking scheme addressed in [1] . Section III elaborates our collusion attack on the buyer watermarking in [1] . Section IV contains the results of our experiments which demonstrate the efficiency of our attack and the quality improvement on the watermarked image.
II. OVERVIEW OF BUYER AUTHENTICATION WATERMARKING
In the watermarking scheme [1] , an image I of N pixels is divided into m disjoint groups evenly. Denote a pixel as I(j), j = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 in raster scan order, and the pixel indexes in a group constitute a set
Each buyer is identified with a unique secret key
1} m which is a binary codeword of an error correcting code to tolerate e = 0.5d−1 or 3 fewer errors, where d is the minimum hamming distance of the code. The scheme [1] targets for identifying at least one buyer from an inspected watermarked image. Thus, it includes two major steps: Generating watermarked image and identifying the buyer. For simplicity, we only investigate the modified watermarking schemes (see Section V in [1] ) in the present paper.
A. Generating Watermarked Image
To generate a watermarked image for a buyer with specific key B = B 0 B 1 · · · B m−1 ∈ {0, 1} m , the original image is manipulated pixel by pixel. The embedding process is very simple. Specifically,
, where Γ(j) varies with the pixel locations, but the sequence {Γ(j)} 0≤j≤N −1 is fixed for an original image, and j∈G k Γ(j) = δ k for a predefined threshold δ k which determines the quality of the watermarked image. Then all the pixels I w (j),
constitute a watermarked image I w .
B. Identifying Buyer
To identify a buyer from an inspected imageÎ w , the buyer's key should be recovered. Technically, the identifying method is as follows.
where c k is a predefined threshold value for controlling the detection error.
In order to increase the robustness, the buyer's key B is recovered from the sequence {q 0 , q 1 , · · · , q m−1 } with the error correcting code. 4 III. ADAPTIVE ATTACK SCHEME Generally speaking, it is the minimal security requirement to defeat average attack [7] for a robust watermarking.
Recently, Wu et al. [12] [13] addressed several non-linear collusion attacks. Due to the large number of variants of collusion attacks, it is hard to prove that a watermarking scheme is resistant to all collusion attacks. Meanwhile, the attack performance of the collusion attack varies with the watermarking scheme. This section describes the weakness of the authentication watermarking [1] and gives an efficient collusion attack. The present attack adaptively selects the pixels of traitor's images so as to create a pirated image of high quality but no traitor is identified. In the Subsections III-A and III-B, we introduce the attack on the scheme where the group G k is independent with the buyers (i.e. the modification 1 in Section V of [1] ). Then, Subsection III-D extends the security analysis to the complicate case where G k depends on the buyers (i.e. the modification 2 in Section V of [1] ).
A. Adaptive Collusion Attack
Suppose that there are t traitors whose watermarked images are I 
B. Resilience to Traitor Tracing
The goal of the watermarking scheme [1] is to trace the buyers' keys when an image is confiscated. Denote the key for the i th buyer as
Define two disjoint sets for the bit indexes of the keys:
and its complement set
Hence, any pirated pixel whose index is in the group G k∈S≡ will be generated in step (2) in Subsection III-A.
On the contrary, ∀j ∈ G k∈S = , there exists i ∈ {2, 3, · · · , t} such that I i w (j) = I 1 w (j). Consequentially, any pirated pixel whose index is in group G k∈S = will be generated in step (3) in Subsection III-A. Therefore, for any k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , m − 1}, the distortion for each group is
Thus, any key bit whose index k ∈ S ≡ can be identified correctly. However, for any key bit whose index k ∈ S = , there are two cases if the number of 0s and 1s in a key are almost equal.
• c k < 0.5: According to the identifying method in Subsection II-B, any key bit whose index is in S = is always
It means that half of key bits whose index are in S = are wrongly identified statistically.
• c k ≥ 0.5:
any key bit whose index is in S = is always regarded as 0. i.e., half of key bits whose index are in S = are wrongly identified statistically.
In summary, no matter what c k is, half of key bits whose indexes are in S = are wrongly identified. Thus the expect number of wrongly identified bits is
given that the probability p(·) is uniform. From the viewpoint of the traitors, the number of wrongly identified bits should be greater than the error correcting capability so that no traitor is traced. That is to say, a successful piracy
In other words, if t = 1 − log 2 (1 − 2e/m) traitors conspire to generate a pirated image, the tracer can not identify any traitor given that the probability of implicating an innocent is reasonably low. 
C. Quality of the Pirated Image
A successful pirated image not only prevents from identifying the traitors, but also is of high quality. To study the quality of the pirated image, we compare the noise energy in the watermarked image I w with that in the pirated image I. Concretely, the noise energy for the original watermarked image is
In the above Eq.3, we assume the number of 0s and 1s in a buyer key are almost equal, and the noise energy for each group is the same value δ 2 . The assumptions are sound for invisible watermarking. Meanwhile, the expect noise inserted into the pirated image is 
(peak signal noise rate) is suitable for qualitatively describing the improvement on the watermarked gray images, 8 we select the ∆ P N SR (the difference of PSNR) to measure the quality change. Thus, ∆ P N SR = 10(log 10 255 2 − log 10 N∆) − 10(log 10 255 2 − log 10 N ∆ w ) = 10(log 10 ∆ w − log 10∆ ) = −10log 10 (0.5 + 2 −t )
In other words, the quality of the pirated image resulted from our attack is better than any watermarked images! As a result, the traitors generate a pirated image of high quality but all the traitors are not identified.
D. Extension to Variable Group
In above Subsections III-A and III-B, we elaborate the attack method given that the group G k is fixed for any buyer. In order to enforce the security, authors [1] suggested a second modification that G k is variable with buyers. Now, let us consider the security of the modification in [1] .
Without loss of generality, let's verify the first traitor whose key 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that all the Γ(j) are over the same uniform distribution with expect valueδ in the above Eq.5. According to Eq.6, a reasonable threshold c k = 0.5 based on decision rule in Subsection II-B. However, the interval (0.5 − 2 −t , 0.5 + 2 −t ) is too small to make a correct decision if we consider computation deviation (e.g. round operation). Indeed, our experiments demonstrate that the number of the detected key bits is roughly 50% of the key length when 4 traitors conspire. Moreover, the interval decreases exponentially with the number of traitors involved. That is to say, the present attack is effective even if it is buyer-dependent to divide the original image in the embedding process.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Because the buyer-dependent segmentation does not obviously enhance the security strength of the original scheme [1] , our experiments merely focus on the modification with invariable segmentation group (i.e., modification 1 in 
A. Resilience to Tracing
Based on the original watermarking scheme [1] , select the buyer's key from the BCH(127,8) code which is able to correct up to e = 31 errors. It enables that 2 8 buyers to own different watermarked images. Given a pirated image generated by 2 or more traitors, the experimental result indicates no traitor is traced. According to Eq.2, t = 1 − log 2 (1 − 2 × 31/127) = 1.97 = 2 traitors can create a pirated image without being identified. It means that the theoretical analysis is in concert with the experimental result.
B. Quality Improvement
In our experiment, PSNR of the pirated image generated by 4 traitors is 50.82dB, while the watermarked image is 49.34dB. That is to say, the experimental result proves that the pirated image is of higher quality than that of the watermarked image. 
V. CONCLUSION
The buyer authentication watermarking scheme [1] divides an image into small groups and modifies the intensity of some pixels depending on a secret key. Our paper presents an adaptive collusion attack to the buyer watermarking scheme by selectively manipulating the watermarked pixels. Concretely, when the traitors find two unequal watermarked pixels generated from the same original pixel, they average these two pixels so as to alleviate the watermark information. This attack not only removes the watermark so that the traitors escape from being identified, but also increases the watermarked image quality. We present a theoretical analysis on the size of traitor group and quality improvement. Our experimental result and theoretical analysis show that the attack is effective.
